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I. INTRODUCTION
"Anybody who has the desire to get their life together shouldn't have any
problem getting drug tested."
-Mather Resident
After the closure of the Mather Air Force Base in Sacramento County,
California, local officials had to determine how to utilize the facilities.2 Sacra-
mento County officials decided to use a portion of the Mather Air Force Base for
the Mather Transitional Housing Program (Mather Program) for the homeless.3
Thus, the Mather Program, which opened in September 1995, was established to
provide transitional housing and job training for 200 single people and sixty
families
However, the opening of the Mather Program was clouded by controversy.
In September of 1995, against recommendations to the contrary, Sacramento
County supervisors narrowly approved a strict drug testing policy for the Mather
Program.5 The drug testing policy, which was drafted by the Sacramento County
Department of Human Assistance (Department), was adopted to assure potential
1. Ross Farrow, Mather's Moving Experience, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 22, 1995, at NI.
2. SeeBobBums, New Plan Offeredfor Mather Site, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 18,1993, at BI (listing
the various plans Sacramento County officials considered for the reuse of the Mather Air Force Base as
including the creation of a civilian airport, the preservation of an existing residential neighborhood that would •
be rehabilitated for first-time buyers, the construction of an artificial lake and wetlands, and the creation of a
regional park).
3. See Robert D. Davila, Mather Homeless Project Beset by Problems, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 17,
1996, at B1 (noting that Sacramento County received a $12.8 million grant from the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development to fund the transitional housing program for five years). See generally
Melanie B. Abbott, Homelessness and Substance Abuse: Is Mandatory Treatment the Solution?, 22 FORDHAM
URB. LJ. 1, 5-6 (1994) (commenting that an analysis conducted by Dr. Fischer reveals that the number of
homeless persons vary from study to study because of the widely divergent definitions of homelessness used);
Steven R. Paisner, Comment, Compassion, Politics, and the Problems Lying on Our Sidewalks: A Legislative
Approach for Cities to Address Homelessness, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 1259, 1263-64 (1994) (suggesting that nobody
knows exactly how many Americans are homeless as illustrated by various surveys); Deborah L. Parker, Note,
Right to Shelterfor the Homeless: The Use of Decision Analysis in Fashioning a Remedy, 81 GEo. L.J. 829,
831 n.20 (1993) (noting that estimates of the number of homeless range between 500,000 to 3 million).
4. See Robert D. Davila, Homeless Program Drug Tests OK'D, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 13, 1995,
at BI (discussing the characteristics of the Mather Program); see also Davila, supra note 3 (reporting the
numerous problems that have plagued the Mather program since its opening; for example, the problems have
included substandard military housing facilities, red tape, and bureaucratic conflicts).
5. SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN ASsIssTANCE, ALCOHOL AND DRUG TESTING
POLICY (1995) [hereinafter MATHER DRUG TESTING POLICY] (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal); see
Davila, supra note 4 (discussing the controversy surrounding the Sacramento County supervisors' decision to
approve the drug testing policy for the Mather Program); Drug-Testing Funds Approved, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Oct. 12, 1995, at B2 (noting that Sacramento County supervisors agreed to spend $103,625 on drug and alcohol
testing for the homeless applicants to the Mather Program). The alcohol and drug testing policy adopted by
the County Board of Supervisors for use in the Mather Program is a pilot program which was evaluated after
10 months for effectiveness, accuracy, and fairness. MATHER DRUG TESTING POLICY, supra, § 5. Recom-
mendations concerning the policy were to be brought before the County Board of Supervisors. Id.
1700
1996/Constitutionality of Drug Testing the Homeless
employers that clients of the Mather Program are alcohol and drug free! The
Mather drug testing policy requires drug and alcohol testing for all applicants to
the Mather Program.7 Applicants who fail the test are denied admission to the
Mather Program. Furthermore, the policy requires program participants to be
subject to both random and suspicion-based testing for the first six months.
9
Thereafter, participants are subject only to suspicion-based testing.'°
This drug and alcohol policy gives rise to significant constitutional con-
cerns.' 1 In fact, the Sacramento County counsel advised the Sacramento County
supervisors that requiring blanket drug testing would probably be subject to a
legal challenge.
12
This Comment analyzes whether the Mather Program's drug testing policy
can withstand constitutional scrutiny. Part II describes the details of the drug
testing policy adopted for the Mather Program.13 Part I sets forth the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment with regard to drug testing, and discusses United
States Supreme Court cases which have dealt with such testing. 14 Finally, Part IV
analyzes the constitutionality of the Mather Program's drug testing policy, and
concludes that the policy is probably unconstitutional.'5
II. MATHER PROGRAM'S DRUG TESTING POLICY
A. Applicant Testing
As a condition to entering the Mather Program, all applicants must submit to
an alcohol and/or drug test.' 6 The Mather Program is a "zero tolerance" program,
and thus any level of a positive result is deemed unacceptable. 17 Applicants who
6. MATHER DRUG TESTING POLICY, supra note 5, § 1.
7. Id.§2.
8. Id.
9. Id. § 3; see infra notes 24-46 and accompanying text (setting forth the procedures for the random
and suspicion-based testing).
10. MATHERDRUGTEsTING POLICY, supra note 5, § 3.
11. See infra notes 163-208 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional concerns with the
Mather Program's drug testing policy).
12. Memorandum from Robert A. Ryan, Jr., County Counsel, to Board of Supervisors, County of
Sacramento (Aug. 4, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
13. See infra notes 16-70 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 71-162 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 163-208 and accompanying text.
16. See MATHER DRUG TESTING POLICY, supra note 5, § 2 (estimating that there will be five
applications for every client selected); see also Ross Farrow, County Mulls Expanding Mather Homeless Plans,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 11, 1996, at NI (noting that since the opening of the Mather Program, applicants have
been drawn exclusively from the Sacramento County homeless shelter system; however, Sacramento County
Supervisors voted unanimously in January 1996 to expand the Mather enrollment policy to include families
who are not residents at County homeless shelters).
17. MATHER DRUG TESTING PoLIc, supra note 5, § 2.
1701
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fail the drug test are forbidden to enter the Mather Program.18 Thereafter, appli-
cants who fail the drug test and hence are prevented from entering the Mather
Program, are assisted with their substance problems through services available
within the Sacramento homeless shelter program. 9 Applicants who fail the drug
test are not allowed to reapply to the Mather Program until they can demonstrate
a minimum of thirty days participation in a substance abuse program. 20 However,
an applicant who reapplies to the Mather Program is still not guaranteed admis-
sion into the program.2'
B. Participant Testing
In developing the alcohol and drug testing policy for the participants in the
Mather Program, the Department decided to combine random and suspicion-
based testing.? As with the policy covering applicants to the Mather Program, the
policy for participants is also "zero tolerance," providing for the expulsion of any
participant who tests positive twice?3
1. Random Testing
Once an applicant is admitted into the Mather Program, he or she is deemed
to be a program participant and is subject to a different alcohol and drug testing
policy than are applicants.24 During the first six months of participation, Mather
Program participants are subject to random testing.? The random selection of
those subject to testing is based upon a scientifically valid method. 26 If the parti-
cipant has not tested positive at the conclusion of the first six months, the
participant is no longer subject to random testing.27 However, the participant is
still subject to testing when there is a reasonable suspicion that the participant is
using drugs or alcohol Furthermore, a participant who is subject to random
18. Id.
19. Id.; see id. (allowing a social worker in certain circumstances to recommend an extension of the
applicant's shelter stay for an additional 30 days).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. § 3.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 3(a).
26. Id.; see id. (recommending the use of a system called the Health Evaluation and Information System
for Drug Abuse in Industry (HEIDI), that is already used by the Departments of Probation, Public Works, and
Airports, as well as the Sheriff, to maintain random pool groups, to perform random selection for drug testing,
and to schedule tests).
27. Id.
28. Id; see infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text (setting forth the Mather Program's suspicion-
based drug testing policy).
1702
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testing during the first six months of participation is also subject to suspicion-
based testing.29
If a participant fails a random test, the participant is required to recommit to
the Mather Program, to agree to remain sober, and to attend counseling sessions
for two weeks.30 A second failure results in *a participant's dismissal from the
Mather Program.3 ' However, an individual dismissed from the Mather Program
may reapply for admission after the individual can demonstrate a minimum of
sixty days participation in a rehabilitation, treatment, or support services program
designed to address substance abuse problems.32 Nevertheless, reapplication after
treatment only allows for, but does not guarantee, readmission into the Mather
Program.33 Of course, upon reapplication to the Mather Program, the applicant
will once again have to pass an alcohol and/or drug test?4
Once a participant is disqualified from the Mather Program, several options
exist. First, the individual can be referred back to the Sacramento homeless
shelter system for assistance with housing and supportive services.35 Second, the
individual can also be referred back to residential recovery programs if the
individual's substance abuse problem is severe enough? 6 As a third option, the
individual can be referred back to the General Assistance program's37 substance
abuse program.38
2. Suspicion-Based Testing
All participants in the Mather Program are required to undergo testing if there
is a reasonable suspicion of alcohol or drug use.39 Reasonable suspicion can exist
if the participant exhibits symptoms and/or behaviors associated with substance
abuse as set forth in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual IV (DSM IV). 4°Reasonable








37. see CAL. WEL'F. & INST. CODE § 17000.5(a) (West Supp. 1996) (authorizing a county board of
supervisors to adopt a general assistance standard of aid).
38. MATHER DRUG TESTING POLICY, supra note 5, § 3(a); see id. (noting that to a limited extent, the
General Assistance substance abuseprogram includes case management and supportive and treatment services
for General Assistance recipients who have a substance abuse problem).
39. Id. § 3(b).
40. Id.; see AMERICANPsYCHiATRICASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTICAND STATISTcALMANUALOFMENTAL
DISORDERS 182-83 (4th ed. 1994) (setting forth the symptoms and/or behaviors associated with substance
abuse as follows: (1) Recurrent substance use resulting in a failure to fulfill major obligations at work, school,
or home; (2) recurrent substance use in situations in which it is physically hazardous; (3) recurrent substance-
related legal problems; and (4) continued substance use despite having recurrent social or interpersonal
1703
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 27
suspicion can also exist if the participant fails to comply with the program's
requirements.4 ' In determining reasonable suspicion, a social worker must assess
whether the symptoms and/or behaviors or the failure to comply with program
requirements are the result of substance abuse rather than some other cause.42
If a participant tests positive to a suspicion-based test, the participant is
required to recommit to the Mather Program and to attend counseling sessions for
a two-week period.43 A subsequent positive test, at the conclusion of the two
weeks, results in dismissal from the Mather Program.44 Again, dismissed parti-
cipants will be eligible to reapply for readmission to the Mather Program after
sixty days of minimum treatment and a clean drug and/or alcohol test. 45 Read-
mission into the program, however, is not guaranteed."
C. Testing Procedures
The Mather Program tests for the presence of alcohol, as well as specified
controlled substances.47 The testing procedure is designed to be as unintrusive as
possible.4 8 The testing procedure includes the following: (1) Notice to all
applicants and participants that they will be required to submit to testing by pro-
viding breath and/or urine samples by indirect observation during application to
and participation in the Mather Program, (2) adequate procedures for ensuring the
chain of custody for the storage of samples, (3) accuracy of identification of
alcohol or controlled substances in the retrieved sample, (4) a reliable quality
assurance program, (5) maintenance of confidentiality of all medical information
obtained through the testing process, and (6) protection of the applicant or parti-
cipant from undue invasion of privacy.49
In drafting this policy, the Department reviewed the alcohol and drug testing
procedures currently used within Sacramento County by the Department of
Human Resources and the Sheriffs Department.5° In addition, the Department
problems caused by the effects of the substance). These symptoms have never met the criteria for Substance
Dependence for this class of substance. Id. at 183.






47. See id. § 4 (listing the following non-prescription controlled substances the Mather Program tests
for marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, phencyclidine, barbiturates, benzodiazephine, and other
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researched industry guidelines and practices relating to substance testing in order
to draft an adequate testing policy.5
The Department, considering several factors, such as timeliness for testing
program implementation, cost effectiveness, and timeliness of results, recom-
mended a combination of various procedures.52 The procedures utilized by the
Sheriff's Department Work Release Program are replicated in the Mather
Program.53 The Sheriff's Department Work Release Program uses on-site drug
testing equipment and routinely conducts a confirmation screening of all speci-
mens that test positive.54 If a specimen tests positive a second time, the individual
is notified of the results.55 If the individual denies drug use, the specimen is then
sent to an outside laboratory for confirmation.5 6 The Mather Program uses this
same approach for confirmation, that is, conducting two tests on-site, notification
to the applicant or participant, and if necessary, sending the specimen to an
outside laboratory for confirmation.
5 7
However, for the outside confirmation test, the Department recommended
that the County Board of Supervisors adopt a drug testing procedure similar to the
one approved for county personnel. 8 If a specimen tests negative, test results will
usually be received within one day.5 9 However, if a specimen tests positive, a
second confirmation test must be performed.6 This confirmation test usually can
be completed within two days.61
An applicant or participant in the Mather Program may challenge the results
of the alcohol and/or drug test through the general appeal procedures applicable









58. lId; see id. (noting that the drug testing procedure approved for county personnel is outlined in the
County Personnel Policies and Procedures B-7, Pre-Employment Drug Testing Program). The policy also
requires the drug testing vendor or laboratory to provide the following follow-up and support services: (1)
Administering initial screening tests, (2) administering second confirmation tests, (3) communicating test
results to the appropriate department representative, (4) providing statistical data on the program, (5) providing
experts to testify at appeal hearings and/or litigation, and (6) ensuring the confidentiality of the drug testing
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D. Governmental Interests
In support of the Mather Program's alcohol and drug testing policy, the
Department emphasized that alcohol and drug problems are rampant among the
homeless population.63 Thus, according to the Department, homeless individuals
with such problems are not able to fully participate in the Mather Program.4
The Mather Program is intended as an employment program, not a drug and
alcohol treatment program.65 The objective of the Mather Program is for the
County to recruit employers who are willing to hire these homeless individuals. 6
However, because of the productivity and other problems associated with em-
ployees who suffer from alcoholism or drug addiction, local employers are often
reluctant to hire homeless individuals with these problems. 67 Thus, the ability to
represent to prospective employers that the Mather Program's clients are alcohol
and drug free is a factor critical to the ultimate success of the Mather Program.68
Therefore, the ultimate rationale behind the alcohol and drug testing policy is to
be able to assure employers that the homeless clients in the Mather Program are
alcohol and drug free.69
- The rationale delineated above is the sole governmental interest given for the
alcohol and drug testing policy in the Mather Program. No other governmental
interests are set forth in the drug testing policy. Nothing is mentioned about
protecting program participants from other participants who may be drunk or
under the influence of drugs. 70 Furthermore, no mention is made about protecting
the surrounding neighborhoods from such individuals. In other words, the testing
policy is designed solely to enable the Mather Program to appear credible to
potential employers in order to ensure the Program's ultimate success.
63. Id. § 1; see Paisner, supra note 3, at 1265 (stating that many of the homeless are addicted to drugs
or alcohol); Parker, supra note 3, at 840 (indicating that 35% of the homeless suffer from alcoholism or
substance abuse).






70. See Parker, supra note 3, at 842-43 (noting that homeless individuals who are alcoholics or drug
abusers may display tendencies towards violence and arson and thus, are a threat to themselves and to others
in homeless shelters, and may even be a threat to the physical structure of the shelter as well).
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II. FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
federal government from conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures."7'
Although the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment apply to the federal govern-
ment and government employers,72 the guarantees do not apply to a private party
who initiates a search or seizure.73 However, the Supreme Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment 74 extends the constitutional guarantees to searches and
seizures by state officers75 and public school officials.
76
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see id. (providing that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"); see also
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (defining a "search" as occuring "when an expectation
of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed" upon); id. (defining a "seizure" of
property as occuring "when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in
that property").
72. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (holding that searches and seizures by
government employers or supervisors of the private property of their employees are subject to the Fourth
Amendment). Nevertheless, this Court, using the "special needs" exception, found that it was permissible for
government employers and supervisors to conduct warrantless, work-related searches of employees' desks and
offices without probable cause. Id. at 725-26. The Court found that the standard should be one of
reasonableness. Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that "requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the
employer wished to enter an employee's office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would
seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome." Id. at 722; see infra note
81 and accompanying text (delineating the "special needs" exception to the probable cause requirement).
73. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113-14 (noting that although the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
a search or seizure, even if unreasonable, conducted by a private party, the Fourth Amendment protects against
such intrusions if the private party acted as an instrument or agent of the government). The Jacobsen case
involved Federal Express employees who opened a torn package to inspect it for damage and found cocaine
inside. Id. at 111-12. The Court held that because Federal Express is a private carrier, the opening of the
package by its employees did not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 115; see Wilkinson
v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1051, 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 205-06 (1989) (holding that Matthew
Bender, a private employer, did not violate article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution, which declares
that privacy is among the people's "inalienable rights," by requiring pre-employment drug testing because the
applicants had notice of the drug testing policy, the samples were collected during a regular pre-employment
physical examination under conditions designed to minimize intrusiveness, and access to the test results were
restricted). However, the California Court of Appeal for the First District warned that this decision did not hold
that all pre-employment drug and alcohol testing by private employers is constitutional under the California
Constitution, just the particular policy adopted by Matthew Bender. Id.
74. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (providing in part that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
75. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960) (extending the Fourth Amendment's
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures to searches conducted by state law enforcement
officers). The Court further emphasized that the test is the same as under federal law. Id. at 224.
76. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-37 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
applies to school officials because they act as representatives of the State, and not merely as surrogates for the
parents).
1707
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The Fourth Amendment requires that in order for a search to be con-
stitutional, the search must be "reasonable."' Whether a particular search meets
the reasonableness standard "is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests."78 In the criminal context, the Supreme Court has held
that a reasonable search generally requires a judicial warrant. 9 However, the
issuance of warrants is conditioned upon the showing of probable cause as re-
quired by the Warrant Clause.'o Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized
exceptions to this rule and has upheld searches unsupported by probable cause
"when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable.""
77. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925) (emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment
prohibits only unreasonable searches or seizures, not reasonable ones); id. at 149 (stating that "the Fourth
Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure [at the time
the amendment] was adopted").
78. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
79. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (stating that under the Fourth Amendment,
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable). However, the police
are allowed to seize weapons or contraband found in a public place without a warrant. Id. at 587. As long as
"there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity," these seizures are allowed because
the seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is therefore presumptively reasonable.
Id.
80. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized"). However, there are exceptions to the warrant requirement when supported by probable cause.
See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1991) (adopting a "car exigency" to the warrant
requirement; thus, the police may search an automobile and any containers within it without a warrant where
they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence will be found inside the automobile); Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30,34 (1970) (suggesting that there is a "destruction of evidence exigency" to the warrant
requirement; thus, the police may be able to conduct a search without a warrant where they believe that the
destruction of evidence is imminent); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,298-300 (1967) (authorizing a "hot
pursuit exigency" to the warrant requirement in this particular case; thus, the Court held that under the
"exigencies of the situation," where police officers were in hot pursuit of a suspected armed felon in the house
that he had entered only minutes before they arrived, no warrant was needed).
81. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). The Supreme Court in this case
found "special needs" to exist in the public school context. In this context, the warrant requirement "would
unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools."
Id. at 340; see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (holding that the
government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety presents "'special needs'
beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause
requirements"); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-76 (1987) (upholding a Wisconsin regulation that
permitted any probation officer to search a probationer's home without a warrant, because the supervision of
probationers was a "special need" of the State that justified departing from the usual warrant and probable
cause requirements); Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722-26 (finding that to "[require] an employer to obtain a warrant
whenever the employer wished to enter an employee's office, desk, or file cabinet for a work-related purpose
would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome"; thus, "special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the probable cause requirement impracticable"); cf.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,316 (1978) (considering the burdens a warrant requirement would
impose on the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) regulatory scheme, and holding that the warrant
requirement was appropriate after concluding that warrants would not impose serious burdens on the inspection
1708
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The Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court,s2 held that in certain cir-
cumstances government officials could conduct administrative searches83 pursuant
to a regulatory scheme without adhering to the usual warrant or probable cause
requirements." The Court adopted a balancing test to determine the reasonable-
ness of a search conducted without probable cause or individualized suspicion."
The reasonableness of a search is determined by "balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails." After determining there is a rea-
sonable search, the probable cause required to issue a warrant exists if there are
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards."87
Subsequently, in Delaware v. Prouse,su the Supreme Court held that adminis-
trative searches of automobiles were reasonable if the searches were based upon
an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed, an auto-
mobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise
subject to seizure for a violation of law.89 The Court articulated a balancing test,
similar to the test used in Camara, for determining the reasonableness of a
random and suspicionless search and seizure? Thus, "the permissibility of a
particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
system or the courts, would not prevent inspections necessary to enforce OSHA, and would not make
inspections less effective).
82. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
83. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 530-32 (indicating that administrative searches are searches conducted
for public health and safety reasons; criminal searches, on the other hand, are conducted to look for evidence
of criminal action).
84. Id. at 536-39. In Camara, the appellant on several occasions refused to permit housing inspectors
to enter his apartment without a warrant to engage in a routine annual inspection. Id. at 525-27.
85. Id. at 536-37. The Court gave three reasons for adopting a generalized probable cause standard: (1)
The long history of public and judicial acceptance of housing inspections, (2) the public interest in preventing
dangerous conditions, and (3) the limited nature of the invasion. Id. at 537.
86. Id. at 536-37.
87. Id. at 538-39; see Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872-73 (holding that the warrantless search of a probationer's
home was "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to
a valid regulation governing probationers); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,703-12 (1987) (deciding that
the warrantless search of an automobile junkyard, conducted pursuant to a statute authorizing such a search,
fell within the exception to the warrant requirement for administrative searches of pervasively regulated
industries); id. at 713-17 (noting further that administrative schemes may have the same ultimate purpose as
penal laws, and thus there is no constitutional significance to the fact that police officers, rather than
"administrative" agents, are permitted to conduct the inspections authorized by the statute); Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. 594, 602-03 (1981) (upholding warrantless inspections required by § 103(a) of the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977 because there was a substantial federal interest in improving the health and
safety conditions in mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,316-17 (1972) (upholding a section of the
Gun Control Act of 1968 that authorized warrantless searches of business premises because the regulatory
inspections furthered urgent federal interests).
88. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
89. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
90. Id. at 653-55.
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governmental interests."9' Using this test, the Court found that the random,
suspicionless stop of the automobile in this case was unconstitutional. 92The Court
found that the State's interest in discretionary spot checks as a means of ensuring
roadway safety did not outweigh the physical and psychological intrusion visited
upon the occupants of a stopped vehicle.
93
The Supreme Court went even further in New Jersey v. T.L 0., 94 and held that
school officials may conduct warrantless searches of some student property
without probable cause.95 The Court, using the balancing test first articulated in
Camara and followed in Prouse, held that a student's privacy interest was
outweighed by the interest of school officials in maintaining school discipline.
9
6
Thus, school officials are constitutionally allowed to search a student's property
if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the student is violating the law
or school rules.97
The Supreme Court has on several other occasions also upheld suspicionless
seizures. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld automobile checkpoints for
illegal immigrants 98 and drunk drivers.99 Despite the number of occasions where
91. Id. at 654.
92. Id. at 663.
93. Id. at 655-61.
94. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
95. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 340-42. However, although there was no probable cause and no warrant here,
the search was supported by individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. Id. at 327-29. In this case, a principal
of a high school searched a student's purse only after she was caught smoking in the bathroom, and after she
denied violating the rule prohibiting smoking in the bathroom. Id.
96. Id. at 339-40.
97. Id. at 341-42. See generally Alexander C. Black, Annotation, Search Conducted by School Official
or Teacher as Violation of Fourth Amendment or Equivalent State Constitutional Provision, 31 A.L.R. 5TH
229 (1995) (discussing cases in which the courts have considered whether a search by school officials violates
the Fourth Amendment or equivalent provisions of state constitutions).
98. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,556-62 (1976) (holding that the Border Patrol's
routine stops of automobiles located on a major highway away near the Mexican border for brief questioning
without any individualized suspicion was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment). The Court concluded
that requiring stops on major routes inland to always be based upon a reasonable suspicion would be
impractical because of the heavy flow of traffic. Id. at 557. Using the Fourth Amendment balancing test, the
Court held that while the government interest to make routine checkpoint stops was high in order to deter
illegal immigration, the intrusion of the private citizen's Fourth Amendment interests was relatively low. Id.
The Court, justifying its claim that the checkpoints' intrusion was minimal, stated that routine checkpoints did
not interfere greatly with traffic. Id. at 559. Furthermore, checkpoint operations involve less discretionary
enforcement activity than roving-patrol stops. Id. at 559-60. In sum, routine stops for brief questioning
conducted at permanent checkpoints were constitutional under the Fourth Amendment and therefore, did not
require a warrant. Id. at 566.
99. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990) (upholding as consistent with
the Fourth Amendment a highway sobriety checkpoint program). The Court noted that the intrusion resulting
from the brief stops here were indistinguishable, for constitutional purposes, from the checkpoint stops that
were upheld in Martinez-Fuerte. Id. at 453. Moreover, the magnitude of the problem associated with drunk
drivers, namely alcohol-related accidents, causing injuries and deaths, was great. Id. at 451. Lastly, the Court
found the checkpoint to be an "effective" method of advancing the governmental interest in preventing drunken
driving. Id. at 453-55.
1710
1996/Constitutionality of Drug Testing the Homeless
the Supreme Court has approved suspicionless searches and seizures, in the drug
testing context, the Supreme Court has approved the constitutionality of drug tests
in only three contexts.
A. Ensuring the Safety of the Public and Fellow Employees
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, I0 the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of drug testing railroad personnel involved in train
accidents. 10 1 The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment is applicable
to the drug and alcohol testing mandated or authorized by the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) because the collection and testing of urine samples intrudes
upon expectations of privacy, and therefore must be deemed a search.'02 The
Court held that the government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad
employees in order to ensure the safety of both the public and the employees
themselves presents a "special need" beyond normal law enforcement so as to
justify departing from the warrant and probable cause requirements.103 In other
words, the government's interest in testing without a showing of individualized
suspicion was high.1°4 Furthermore, the Court was concerned that the delay
caused by having to procure a warrant would result in the destruction of valuable
evidence, since alcohol and drugs might be eliminated from the bloodstream
before a warrant could be obtained. 05
On the other hand, the Court held that an individual's privacy interest was not
as "compelling" as the governmental interest in conducting the testing. °'6 The
privacy expectations of the tested employees were diminished by the fact that
they worked in an industry that is highly regulated by the federal and state
governments to ensure safety.0 7 The regulations governing the collection of the
100. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
101. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34.
102. Id. at 617-18. In addition, the collection and testing of urine samples is also a Fourth Amendment
seizure, since it is a meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in his or her bodily fluids.
Id. at 617.
103. Id. at 620-21.
104. Id. at 628.
105. Id. at 623-24.
106. Id. at 627-33.
107. Id. at 627-28. For examples of some of these regulations, see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 37-2-85(a) (1992)
(requiring that persons employed as train dispatchers, engineers, conductors, flagmen, brakemen, trackmen,
and switchmen be subjected to a thorough examination of his or her character, sobriety, knowledge, eyesight
and hearing); N.Y. R.R. LAW § 63 (McKinney 1991) (requiring that all applicants for positions as motormen
or gripmen "be subjected to a thorough examination by the officers of the [railroad] corporation as to their
habits, physical ability and intelligence"); OFhO REV. CODE ANN. § 4999.16 (Anderson 1991) (providing that
no railroad company shall employ a person in a position which requires such person to distinguish form or
color signals without administering a color blindness test); and OR. REv. STAT. § 824.028(1) (1995) (requiring
that persons employed by the Oregon Department of Transportation as railroad inspectors must pass an
examination concerning physical and mental fitness).
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urine necessary for the drug tests further reduced the intrusiveness of the
collection process by requiring that the samples be furnished in a medical en-
vironment, without direct observation. 0 8 For these reasons, the Supreme Court
upheld the suspicionless alcohol and drug testing programs as reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.'0
9
B. Ensuring Fitness, Integrity, and Judgement of Employees Authorized to
Use Deadly Force
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,"0 the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the random drug testing of federal custom officers
who carry firearms or who are involved in drug interdiction.' The Court con-
cluded that when the federal government requires its employees to take a
urinalysis test to look for drug use, the collection and testing of such samples are
searches which must meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment."2 Nevertheless, the Custom Service's testing program was not designed to
serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement" 3 The Court held that under the
Fourth Amendment's balancing test, the government's need to conduct the sus-
picionless searches outweighed the privacy interests of those employees engaged
directly in drug interdiction and/or those employees required to carry firearms. 
4
The Court stressed the important role the Customs Service provides in
fighting the national drug problem." 5 Thus, the government had a "compelling
interest" to ensure that these employees are "physically fit, and have unim-
peachable integrity and judgment."" 6 Furthermore, the public should not be put
108. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626-27. However, Justice Marshall, in his dissent, suggested that compelling
a person to produce a urine sample on demand intrudes deeply on both privacy and bodily integrity. Id. at 645-
47.
109. Id. at 634. However, the alcohol and drug testing programs cannot accurately be described as totally
suspicionless. The FRA provided for mandatory blood, urine, and breath tests for railroad employees only after
employees were involved in a serious train accident, an incident involving a fatality of an employee, or only
after other specifically defined incidents. Id. at 609.
110. 489 U.s. 656 (1989).
111. Von Rabb, 489 U.S. at 679. See generally Kathleen M. Dorr, Annotation, Validity, Under Federal
Constitution, of Regulations, Rules, or Statutes Requiring Random or Mass Drug Testing of Public Employees
or Persons Whose Employment is Regulated by State, Local, or Federal Government, 86 A.L.R. FED. 420
(1988) (analyzing federal and state cases which have discussed the constitutionality of mass or random drug
testing of public employees).
112. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
113. Id. at 666. In concluding that the Custom Service's drug testing program was not designed to serve
the ordinary needs of law enforcement, the Court stressed the fact that test results may not be used in a criminal
prosecution of an employee without the employee's consent, and the purposes of the program were to deter
drug use among a certain class of employees. Id.
114. Id. at 668.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 670.
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at risk by employees impaired by drug use who are in positions where deadly
force is sometimes utilized.
117
Moreover, the character of the intrusion involved was slight. The employees
were given advance notice of the urinalysis test." 8 Upon reporting for the
urinalysis test; which was conducted by an independent contractor, the employees
were only asked to remove outer garments and personal belongings." 9 Further-
more, the employees had the choice of producing the sample behind a partition
or in a bathroom stall.' 20 A monitor of the same sex of the employees remained
within listening range to listen for the normal sounds of urination.'
On the privacy interest side, the Court noted that Customs employees in this
line of work should have a diminished expectation of privacy interests because
they should expect inquiries into their fitness and probity.'2 Moreover, by only
testing certain groups of employees and giving those employees advance notice
of the drug test, the intrusion upon an individual's privacy was minimized.'2 In
addition, the urine samples could only be examined for specified drugs, and not
for other substances. 24 Lastly, the employees were not required to disclose
personal medical information to the government unless his or her test result came
back positive.'25 Overall, a warrant was not required under the Fourth Amend-
ment's balancing test in the context of this situation.'2 The Court stated that a
warrant would have pro ,ided little or no additional protection of an employee's
privacy because the program was narrowly defined and well known to the
covered employees' 27
In Skinner and Von Raab, the Court developed the "compelling need" test
which was a part of the balancing test of privacy interests versus governmental
interests. If the government had a "compelling need" to conduct drug tests, and
that need outweighed a person's privacy interests, then the drug test would be
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. However, after these two decisions,
critics felt that the Court's tolerance for suspicionless drug testing was quite
117. Id. at 670-71.
118. Id. at 661.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. In addition, dye was added to the toilet water to prevent the employees from using the water to
adulterate the sample. Id.
122. Id. at 672.
123. Id. at 672 n.2.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 673 n.2.
126. Id. at 666. However, the Supreme Court was not able to determine the reasonableness of the
government's drug testing program as it related to employees who were required "to handle classified
material." Id. at 677.
127. Id. at 667.
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limited.' 2' Thus, it seemed that the government could only satisfy the "compelling
need" for a suspicionless drug testing policy where public safety or national
security were somehow in danger.129 Nevertheless, the Court appeared to move
away from the "compelling need" test in its next case dealing with random drug
testing, and thus seemed to invite more suspicionless drug testing programs.
C. Drug Testing Student Athletes and the Important Interest Test
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,' 30 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the district's policy of randomly drug testing student
athletes.13 ' Again, the Court, in determining the "reasonableness" of a search
under the Fourth Amendment, balanced the intrusion on the student's Fourth
Amendment interests with the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.
32
The Court began by looking at the nature of the privacy interest involved.1
33
The Court emphasized the fact that the drug testing policy was aimed at children
who had been committed to the temporary custody of the state as "school-
master."' 34 The Court concluded that schoolchildren have a diminished ex
128. See Bruce Fein & William B. Reynolds, Drug Testing No 4th Amendment Threat, LEGAL TPIES,
May 8, 1989, at 22 (rejecting the claim that the Court in Von Raab and Skinner "'tore a gaping new hole in the
Fourth Amendment' protection against unreasonable search and seizure" because the Court's conclusions in
the two cases were narrowly drawn). See generally Lois Yurow, Note, Alternative Challenges to Drug Testing
of Government Employees: Options After Von Raab and Skinner, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 148 (1989)
(analyzing, and rejecting, alternative grounds other than the Fourth Amendment for claims against drug testing
of federal government employees such as procedural due process, the right against self-incrimination, the right
to privacy, and the federal Rehabilitation Act).
129. See supra notes 100-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Skinner and Von Raab decisions).
130. 115 S. CL 2386 (1995).
131. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2396. See generally Kathleen M. Dorr, Annotation, Validity,
Under Federal Constitution, of Regulations, Rules, or Statutes Allowing Drug Testing of Students, 87 A.L.R.
FED. 148 (1988) (discussing federal and state cases which have discussed the constitutionality of drug testing
students).
132. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2391-96; see David Cole, Tough Times at Vernonia High,
LEGALTIMES, July 31, 1995, at 525 (criticizing the Vernonia Court's use of the "reasonableness" test to reach
the result it did because the "reasonableness" test is not precisely defined and too liberal, and therefore the use
of the test could lead to upholding many different drug testing policies).
133. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2391. The Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment does
not protect all subjective expectations of privacy, but only those that society recognizes as "legitimate." Id.
However, what expectations are considered "legitimate" varies with the context, depending upon whether the
individual is asserting the privacy interest at home, at work, in a car, or in a public place. Id.
134. Id. The Court has on several occasions ruled that the constitutional rights of schoolchildren are
different than the constitutional rights of adults. Thus, while the Court has cautioned that students do not "shed
their constitutional rights... at the schoolhouse gate," Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), the Court has nevertheless stripped schoolchildren of some of their constitutional
rights while they are inside the schoolhouse gate. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
272-73 (1988) (concluding that public school authorities did not violate the First Amendment by censoring
school-sponsored publications, so long as the censorship was "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns"); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-86 (1986) (holding that the First
Amendment did not prevent a school district from disciplining a student for giving an offensively lewd and
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pectation of privacy because they are subject to the guardianship of the school.135
In addition, schoolchildren are routinely required to submit to various physical
examinations and vaccinations. 136 Moreover, the Court went on to conclude that
student athletes have even lower expectations of privacy than students who are
not athletes because student athletes change and shower in public school locker
rooms that are not notable for privacy. 37 For example, in these public school
locker rooms, many bathroom stalls do not even have doors. 38
The Court went on to note that there are additional reasons why school
athletes have reduced expectations of privacy. For one, student athletes must sub-
mit to a physical examination prior to their participation in sports. 139 Additionally,
student athletes "choose" to "go out for the team."' 4 The Court analogized
student athletes who "choose" to "go out for the team" with adults who "choose"
to work in a "closely regulated industry.' 14' By voluntarily becoming student
athletes, the Court suggested that these athletes, "have reason to expect intrusions
upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy."'
42
The Court next examined the character of the intrusion involved.143 The
degree of intrusion is dependent upon the manner in which production of the
urine sample is monitored for a urinalysis test.144 In this case, male students
produced urine samples from urinals which were located along a wall. 45 The
students remained fully clothed and were only observed from behind. 46 Female
indecent speech at a school assembly); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (holding that school
officials, with some restrictions, need not obtain a warrant per the Fourth Amendment before searching a
student who is under their authority); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975) (holding that due process
for a student challenging disciplinary suspension requires only that the teacher "informally discuss the alleged
misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred").
135. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471, 115 S. CL at 2392.
136. Id. However, Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, rejected the argument that physical examinations
and vaccinations lead to schoolchildren having diminishea expectations of privacy. Id. at 2405. She noted that
such searches do not reflect wrongdoing on the students' part, but rather, are performed for medical reasons.
Id.
137. Id. at 2392-93. The locker rooms in Vernonia had no individual dressing rooms and the shower
heads were lined up along one wall with no partitions or curtains. Id. at 2393.
138. Id. at 2393.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.; see supra note 107 and accompanying text (noting the Skinner Court's reasoning that privacy
expectations of railroad employees are diminished by the fact that they work in an industry that is regulated
by the federal and state governments); see also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972) (noting
that when a firearms dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business, he or she does so with
the knowledge that business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to inspection without a warrant
where specifically authorized by statute).
142. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471, 115 S. CL at 2393.
143. Id.
144. Id. In addition to urine samples, student athletes were required to identify in advance any
prescription medications they were taking. Id. at 2394.
145. Id. at 2393.
146. Id.
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students, on the other hand, were allowed to produce urine samples in enclosed
stalls, with a female monitor standing outside to listen for sounds of tampering.
1 47
The Court concluded that since these conditions mirrored those typically found
in public restrooms, the intrusion upon the privacy interests involved in obtaining
the urine samples was "negligible."'
48
Furthermore, the Court also noted that the drug tests involved here only
looked for drugs and not for other conditions, such as epilepsy, pregnancy, or
diabetes. 49 In addition, positive test results were only disclosed to a limited
number of school personnel, and not to other school personnel or law enforce-
ment officials. 150 Lastly, the Court followed its decision in Skinner, finding that
the advance disclosure of medications was not "a significant invasion of
privacy.'
5'
The Court balanced these privacy interests with the governmental interests
behind the testing policy. 52 However, in response to the "compelling need" test
used in Skinner and Von Raab, the Court stated that this phrase did not describe
"a fixed, minimum quantum of governmental concern, so that one can dispose of
a case by answering in isolation the question: Is there a compelling state interest
here? Rather, the phrase describes an interest which appears important enough to
justify the particular search at hand .... "', Thus, it appeared that the Court
moved away from the rather stringent "compelling need" test and replaced it with
a more liberal "important interest" test.' 4
Using this new standard, the Court went on to hold that the governmental
concern here was "important," if not "compelling."'' 55 On the governmental
interest side, the Court emphasized the need to deter schoolchildren from using





151. Id. at 2394. The Court noted that it has never indicated that requiring advance disclosure of
medications is per se unreasonable. Id. Furthermore, under the Vemonia policy, students could provide the
requested information in a confidential manner. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2394-95 (emphasis added).
154. See Memorandum from Robert A. Ryan, Jr., County Counsel, to Board of Supervisors, County of
Sacramento, supra note 12 (concluding that "in [Vernonia] the United States Supreme Court appeared to back
away from a compelling interest test, at least within the school/child context presented by that case.... The
Court imposed its own balancing test of 'important' interests against the level of intrusion and the expectation
of privacy").
155. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2395. In both Skinner and Von Raab, the Court characterized
the governmental interest as "compelling:' Id. at 2394. In Skinner, the "compelling" interest was in preventing
railroad accidents. See id. In Von Raab, the "compelling" interest was ensuring the fitness of customs officials
who interdict the drug trade and/or carry firearms. See id.
156. Id. at 2395.
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system, they had the potential of disrupting the entire educational process 57
Finally, the Court noted that drugs pose substantial psychological and physical
risks to athletes.
58
However, despite the Court's decision that drug testing student athletes was
constitutional, the Court was eager to warn that "suspicionless drug testing will
[not] readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts., 159 The Court stressed
that the most significant element in this case was "that the [p]olicy was under-
taken in furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under a public school
system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care."' 6 The relevant
question, the Court stated, is whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian
and tutor might undertake.' 6 ' The Court found that in this context the searches
were what a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake. 62
With these cases in mind, it is now necessary to turn to the issue presented
in this Comment: Is the Mather Program's drug testing policy constitutional?
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MATHER PROGRAM'S DRUG TESTING
POLICY
The collection and testing of urine for evidence of drug use is deemed to be
a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.163 Thus,
whether the drug testing policy for the Mather Program will withstand con-
stitutional scrutiny depends upon whether the policy will meet the "reasonable-
ness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment.' 64 In other words, the privacy
interests of the Mather-Program's applicants and participants must be balanced
against the governmental interests involved in requiring the drug tests. However,
in determining whether the Mather Program's drug testing poHcy is con-
157. Id. At the time of this case, the Vernonia School District was experiencing many problems. Id. For
example, students were in a state of rebellion and disciplinary actions had increased significantly. Id. These
problems were attributed to alcohol and drug abuse. Id.
158. Id. The Court listed thepsychological effects to include impairment of judgment, slow reaction
time, and the lessening of the perception of pain. Id. The Court listed the physical effects to include, among
others, artificially induced heart rate increases, blood pressure increases, irregular blood pressure responses
during changes in body position, and the inhibition of the normal sweating responses. Id.
159. Id. at 2396.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2397.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68
(1966) (holding that the taking of blood to be analyzed for the presence of alcohol is a Fourth Amendment
search).
164. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing the "reasonableness" standard of the
Fourth Amendment).
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stitutional, the issue arises whether the Court would use the "compelling need"
or the "important interests" test.
165
A. "Compelling Need" Test
Prior to Vernonia School District, the Court utilized the "compelling need"
test in determining whether drug tests were constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. t6 Under the "compelling need" test, the Mather Program's drug
testing policy would most likely be held to. be unconstitutional.' 67 The govern-
mental interest involved in the Mather Program, the ability to recruit employers
by representing that Mather Program participants are drug free, is not a "com-
pelling" governmental interest. The Court has recognized that only those govern-
mental interests in protecting public safety or national security may be deemed
"compelling."' 6 Neither of those interests are implicated here.'69
Moreover, the collection of urine samples for a drug test has been recognized
as intruding upon "an excretory function traditionally shielded by great,,170 under
privacy. Thus, under the "compelling need" test articulated by the Skinner and
Von Raab Courts, the Mather Program's drug testing policy would most likely
fail if subject to a constitutional challenge because the privacy interests of the
Mather Program's applicants and participants would outweigh the non-
compelling governmental interests.
165. See infra notes 166-98 and accompanying text (analyzing the Mather Program's drug testing policy
under both the "compelling need" and the "important interests" tests).
166. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing how the Skinner and Von Raab Courts
developed the "compelling need" test).
167. Cf. Abbott, supra note 3, at 60-62 (suggesting in an article written prior to the Vernonia School
District decision, that under the "compelling need" test, drug tests administered as a condition of admission
to a Housing/Treatment Program (H/TP) model, would be held to be constitutional). The author, working by
analogy with Skinner and Von Raab, noted that the only uses positive drug tests would serve in the H/TP case
were first to enroll a substance-abuser in the program, and second to dismiss a recalcitrant drug user from the
program. Id. at 61. These uses for the drug tests did not carry the stigma associated with being fired from ajob.
Id. Furthermore, the program officials had no discretion in determining who was to be tested because all
potential residents were tested, along with participants in the program being monitored. Id. Balanced against
these privacy intrusions was the governmental interest in protecting those residents who were drug free. Id.
Active drug users could pose a danger to those who were trying to stay drug free. Id. at 62. Thus, the author
concluded that in view of this danger, and in light of the governmental interest in helping substance abusers
solve their homelessness problem by solving their substance abuse problem, the Supreme Court would find
the governmental interest involved to be rational. Id.
168. See supra text accompanying note 129 (suggesting that under the "compelling need" test, a
suspicionless drug testing policy would only be upheld where public safety or national security were somehow
in danger).
169. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (noting that the Mather Program's drug testing policy
is not designed to address the safety of the participants or the surrounding neighborhoods but rather is designed
to attract potential employers).
170. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989).
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B. "Important Interests" Test
In Vemonia School District, the Court appeared to move away from the
"compelling need" test and replaced it with the more liberal balancing test of
"important interests."'' Using this new test, the Court in Vernonia School District
upheld the constitutionality of random drug tests of student athletes for rather
weak governmental interests.'17 Thus, the likelihood that the Court would uphold
the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing policies after the Vernonia
School District decision seems to have increased.
However, the Vernonia School District decision can be viewed in a narrower
context also. As noted before, the Court heavily emphasized the fact that the
individuals being drug tested in Vernonia School District were schoolchildren.1
7 3
Arguably, the Vernonia School District Court was moving away from the
"compelling need" test only in the context of schoolchildren. The Vernonia
School District Court warned:
We caution against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will
readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts. The most significant
element in this case is the first we discussed: that the Policy was
undertaken in furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under a
public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its
care.
174
Thus, the Court possibly meant to keep the "compelling need" test in all
contexts except those involving schoolchildren. Therefore, since a "compelling
need" test would most likely be applied, the Mather Program's drug testing policy
would probably be held unconstitutional. 175
The Court could nevertheless choose to apply the "important interests" test
to the Mather Program, analogizing that homeless persons are "entrusted" to the
government's care similar to schoolchildren. 76 If the Court were to use the
171. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Vernonia School District Court's
move away from the "compelling need" test to the "important interests" test).
172. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text (delineating the governmental interests involved
in Vernonia); see also Cole, supra note 132, at S25 (criticizing the Vernonia School District Court's use of an
open-ended "reasonableness" test).
173. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (setting forth the Court's emphasis on school-
children).
174. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386,2396 (1995).
175. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text (discussing how the Mather Program's drug testing
policy would probably be unconstitutional under the "compelling need" test).
176. Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-19 (1982) (holding that a retarded man committed to
a state school and hospital, i.e. "entrusted to the government's care," had a constitutionally protected liberty
interest under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to reasonably safe conditions of
confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such minimally adequate training as reasonably
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"important interests" test in analyzing the constitutionality of the Mather
Program's drug testing policy, the Program's policy would have a better chance
of surviving scrutiny. 77
1. Privacy Interests
Unlike Vernonia School District, the subjects of the Mather Program's drug
testing policy are not student athletes, but rather, homeless individuals. Like
schoolchildren, however, homeless individuals seeking help at a homeless shelter
may have diminished expectations of privacy because they are subject to the care
of the government. There are many similarities between locker rooms and home-
less shelters. In homeless shelters, the sleeping areas and bathing areas are often
communal. Moreover, like student athletes who "choose" to "go out for the
team," homeless individuals "choose" to seek help at a homeless shelter, and thus
should expect intrusions upon their privacy rights because of the communal
nature of homeless shelters. 78 In addition, if homeless individuals "choose" to go
to a homeless shelter which is operated by the government, this might be another
reason why they should reasonably expect intrusions upon their privacy.
However feasible these privacy arguments might be concerning homeless
shelters, these arguments are inapplicable to the Mather Program. The Mather
Program is a transitional housing program which is different from a homeless
shelter. The units in the Mather Program are individual apartments with their own
living rooms, bedrooms, kitchens, and bathrooms. 179 Thus, it is hard to imagine
that individuals entering the Mather Program would have diminished expectations
of privacy given the particular living arrangements. 180 Although the individuals
might have some diminished expectations of privacy given the fact that the
may be required by these interests).
177. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.l-3 (discussing why the Mather Program's drug testing policy could
be constitutional or unconstitutional under the "important interests" test).
178. On the other hand, it should be noted that most homeless individuals do not "choose" to become
homeless.
179. See Farrow, supra note 1, at NI (reporting that a single mother and her three children received an
apartment at the Mather Program with a living room, three bedrooms, two small kitchens and four bathrooms).
180. Cf. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1570-73 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (finding that the
homeless plaintiffs had a legitimate expectation of privacy in their personal property; thus, the court found the
City of Miami liable for unlawful seizures of plaintiffs' property in violation of the Fourth Amendment);
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Unknown Agents of the United States Marshals Service, 797 F.
Supp. 7, 9, 13-20 (D.C. 1992) (stating that "[h]omeless citizens are entitled to no less and no more protection
under the Fourth Amendment than those in our country who have housing;" thus, the court held that United
States Marshals violated the homeless plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights when they conducted a pre-dawn
'raid' of a homeless shelter armed only with an arrest warrant for one particular individual); State v. Mooney,
588 A.2d 145, 150 (Conn. 1991) (holding that a homeless individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of his duffel bag and cardboard box, which he kept under a bridge abutment where he was
living; thus, the warrantless search of these items by the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights and the
evidence found should have been suppressed).
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apartments are furnished by the government, it seems that these individuals would
have more expectations of privacy than the student athletes who undress and
shower in public school locker rooms. The Court has consistently recognized that
individuals have more expectations of privacy in their own homes. 81 For the
individuals at the Mather Program, these apartments are their homes.
2. Character of the Intrusion
In Vernonia School District, the Court examined the character of the intrusion
involved in collecting and analyzing the urine samples for drugs.'82 The Court
found no significant invasion of privacy in the school district's methods of
collecting and analyzing the urine samples. 3
The Mather Program's drug testing policy states that the testing procedure is
designed to be minimally intrusive.'4 As in the Vernonia School District case, the
testing procedure in the Mather Program contains a notice to all applicants and
participants,'85 procedures for ensuring the chain of custody and storage, pro-
cedures for the accuracy of identification of drugs in the samples, a reliable
quality assurance program, methods to ensure confidentiality of all medical
information, and the protection of the applicant or participant from undue
invasion of privacy.186 Moreover, the Mather Program is using a combination of
procedures that is currently being used by the Department of Human Resources
and the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department.8 7 Although there is a pos-
181. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,477,484-88 (1988) (holding that an ordinance making
it "unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual"
is not facially invalid under the First Amendment because, in part, the ordinance served the significant
government interest of protecting unwilling listeners within their homes from the intrusion of unwanted
speech); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 574, 586-90 (1980) (requiring that the police obtain a warrant
before entering a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest); Federal Communications Comm'n
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (noting that of all forms of communication, broadcasting has
the most limited First Amendment protection because, in part, it extends into the privacy of the home and it
is impossible completely to avoid those that are patently offensive); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568
(1969) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits making the mere private possession of obscene material
in one's own home a crime); id. at 564-65 (emphasizing repeatedly that individuals have the right to privacy
in their own homes); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (stating that "[a]t the very core [of
the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion").
182. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Vernonia School District Court's
analysis of the character of the intrusion involved in the school district's drug testing policy).
183. Id.
184. MATHER DRUGTESTING POLICY, supra note 5, § 4.
185. Cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (holding that routine checkpoint
stops do not intrude on the privacy of the motoring public because motorists "are not taken by surprise as they
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere");
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,319-21 (1971) (providing a welfare recipient with written notice several days
in advance of an intended home visitation minimized the intrusion on privacy that the visit brought).
186. MATHER DRUG TETING POLICY, supra note 5, § 4.
187. Id.
1721
Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 27
sibility that these procedures might later be determined to be unconstitutional, it
seems safe for the Mather Program to adopt these procedures that have yet to lose
a constitutional challenge.
However, although the Mather Program's procedures are probably not
intrusive, there are less intrusive means that the government could utilize in lieu
of the drug testing policy and still maintain the Mather Program as drug free.
Although the Court has declined to hold that only the "least intrusive" search
practicable can be deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,'t" an
examination of the alternatives available to meet the Mather Program's objectives
is necessary in order to determine if a drug testing policy is overly intrusive.
Sacramento County supervisors rejected two less stringent proposals to
ensure that the Mather Program was drug free.' 89 The two less stringent proposals
included the following: (1) Requiring testing for all applicants but limiting the
random testing for those "at risk" participants during the first six months of
participation; and (2) requiring testing for applicants in the same manner as for
the participants.' 9° Despite these suggested alternatives, the County supervisors
adopted the tougher drug testing policy in order to help ensure the success of the
Mather Program. 191
In addition, there are other alternatives that would be less intrusive than the
drug testing policy. For example, the Mather Program could screen applicants via
written and oral tests, 92 and then use a suspicion-based drug testing policy for
program participants.193 Alternatively, the Mather Program could eliminate drug
188. See Venonia Sch. Dist. 47.1, 115 S. Ct. at 2395-96 (rejecting the argument that less intrusive means,
namely suspicion-based testing, is superior to random testing to achieve the same results because suspicion-
based testing is accusatory in nature); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1987) (holding that
reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfied the Fourth
Amendment although 'less intrusive' procedures could have been devised); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640,
647 (1983) (noting that the "reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or
invariably turn on the existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means"); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
447-48 (1973) (upholding the search of the trunk of a car to find a revolver suspected of being there, while
rejecting the contention that the public could equally well have been protected by posting a guard over the car);
see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985) (suggesting that "[a] creative judge engaged in
post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the
objectives of the police might have been accomplished").
189. Davila, supra note 4, at B1.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting Supervisor Dave Cox as saying in regards to the drug testing proposal that "[tihis
board just needs to assume the risk of being sued").
192. See Caitlin Rother, Drug Tests Soon to Accompany Relief Benefits Screening, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., May 22, 1995, at B2 (reporting that in San Diego County, applicants for General Relief benefits have
to undergo a drug and alcohol test by taking a 10-minute written or oral test). This article also noted that
General Relief recipients in Oceanside and Logan Heights have been tested in this manner since February of
1995. Id. The tests in April 1995 found nearly half the 1768 screened recipients to be chemically dependent
in those counties. Id.
193. Compare Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471, 115 S. Ct. at 2396 (suggesting that suspicion-based testing is
worse than random testing in part because of the accusatory nature involved with suspicion-based testing) with
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that blanket searches, because
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testing altogether and merely have a "drug free" policy that participants would be
required to adhere to. If a participant was.caught violating the "drug free" policy,
he or she would then be discharged from the program. Clearly, these alternatives
are not as effective in maintaining a drug free environment as the blanket testing
of applicants and the random and suspicion-based testing of participants because
these alternatives would not identify as many drug users as the urinalysis tests.
Overall, since the Mather Program's procedures are similar to those upheld
in Vernonia School District and are based on existing drug testing procedures in
other County Departments, the Court should not have any hesitation in finding
that the invasion of privacy occasioned by the drug testing procedures is minimal.
However, the existence of alternatives capable of fulfilling the governmental
interest indicates that the drug testing policy might be more intrusive than
necessary.
3. Governmental Interests
If the Court utilizes the "important interests" test in analyzing the Mather
Program's random drug testing policy, the Court will have to determine if the
government's interest is important enough to justify the invasiveness of the drug
testing policy. 94
On the one hand, the government's interest in eliminating drug use in the
Mather Program is an important enough interest to justify the implementation of
the drug testing policy. Eliminating drug use in the Mather Program by adopting
a drug testing policy helps maintain the credibility of the program as well as
ensure the program's success.!" s In addition, the drug testing policy helps justify
the financial expenditures involved in setting up the Mather Program by helping
to ensure that more employers use the program.' 96 Since the drug testing policy
only has to achieve "important goals" under the "important interests" test in order
to survive constitutional scrutiny, the government's interests here appear to meet
that test.
On the other hand, the governmental interest here can be characterized as
"generic." The Mather Program's drug testing policy is designed solely to main-
tain a drug free program in order to attract potential employers to hire the
they can involve "thousands or millions" of searches, "pose a greater threat to liberty" than do suspicion-based
ones, which "affect one person at a time").
194. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (articulating the "important interests" test).
195. See Abbott, supra note 3, at 3 (suggesting that a successful solution to the homeless problem must
address substance abuse); id. at 7 (stating that advocates for the homeless admit that viable solutions to the
homeless problem require an acknowledgement that substance abuse problems exist among the homeless);
Paisner, supra note 3, at 1261 (stating that a solution to the homeless problem has to involve housing, job
training, drug and alcohol treatment, and mental health care).
196. See Davila, supra note 3, at BI (noting that Sacramento County received a $12.8 million grant from
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development for the Mather Program).
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program's participants. 97 Nowhere in the drug testing policy is there any
indication that the policy is based on other governmental interests. There are no
interests expressed that seek to protect the safety of the participants or the sur-
rounding neighborhoods from those who are addicted to drugs. Although the drug
testing policy is designed to achieve the goal of eliminating drug use in the
program, this objective might not be important or specific enough to justify the
privacy intrusion. A review of Supreme Court cases demonstrates that the Court
will not accept any interest as "important," since the Court in the drug testing
context has only upheld drug testing under the "important interests" test in one
specialized, student athlete context.9
Overall, if the Court were to use the "important interests" test in analyzing the
constitutionality of the Mather Program's drug testing policy, it is debateable
whether the Court would find the policy constitutional or not. However, this point
is moot until the next question is answered: Which test would the Court use in
analyzing the Mather Program's drug testing policy, the "compelling need" or
"important interests?"
C. Proper Test for the Mather Program's Drug Testing Policy
In order for the Mather Program's drug testing policy to have a chance to
survive constitutional scrutiny, the Court must be willing to use the "important
interests" test, because the policy most likely would be deemed unconstitutional
under the "compelling need" test.1 9 Since the Court has only utilized the
"important interests" test in the student athlete context presented in Vernonia
School District, the question becomes whether the Court would be willing to
expand the use of that test to include the homeless in the Mather Program.
In Vernonia School District, the Court warned that "suspicionless drug testing
will [not] readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts. '"20 The Court
further emphasized that the most significant factor in the case was "that the
[p]olicy was undertaken in furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under
a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care."20'
A look at the literal language of the Vernonia School District opinion indicates
that the Court's use of the "important interests" test was driven by the fact that
schoolchildren were involved. Apparently, the Court is not eager to expand the
use of the "important interests" test into other contexts.
197. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text (discussing the governmental interests involved in
the Mather Program's drug testing policy).
198. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text (discussing how the Vernonia School District Court
upheld the constitutionality of random drug testing of student athletes under the "important interests" test).
199. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text (concluding that the Matl~er Program's drug testing
policy is probably unconstitutional under the "compelling need" test).
200. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386,2396 (1995).
201. Id.
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However, the Vernonia School District Court did not absolutely foreclose the
possibility of using the "important interests" test in other contexts. The.Vernonia
School District Court merely stated that "suspicionless drug testing will [not]
readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts." 2 2 This statement does not
mean that suspicionless drug testing will never survive constitutional scrutiny.
Thus, conceivably the Court might utilize the "important interests" test in a
context analogous to student athletes.
As mentioned above, there are some similarities between homeless
individuals and student athletes.203 Since both are "entrusted" to the government's
care, both may have lower expectations of privacy.24 In addition, a lot of home-
less shelters are similar in nature to the locker rooms emphasized by the Vernonia
School District Court.C 5 Lastly, both can be analogized to adults who "choose"
to work in a "closely regulated industry."
However, as was also mentioned above, these similarities are weak as applied
to the Mather Program."7 Since the Mather Program is a transitional housing
program and not a homeless shelter, the analogy between the homeless
individuals in the Mather Program and the student athletes in Vernonia School
District is a stretch. Thus, the Court would probably not use the "important
interests" test in analyzing the constitutionality of the Mather Program's drug
testing policy. Since the "compelling need" test is the proper test for analyzing the
Mather Program's drug testing policy, the policy is probably unconstitutional.2°s
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the similarities between homeless individuals and
student athletes).
204. See id. (explaining why homeless individuals "entrusted" to the government's care might have
lower expectations of privacy).
205. See id. (demonstrating the similarities between homeless shelters and locker rooms).
206. See id. (discussing how student athletes and the homeless at shelters "choose" their respective
positions).
207. See id. (explaining why the similarities between student athletes and the homeless in homeless
shelters are inapplicable to the Mather Program).
208. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text (concluding that the Mather Program's drug testing
policy is probably unconstitutional under the "compelling need" test). The analysis and the conclusion are the
same for both the random testing and the suspicion-based testing. Both testing polices require balancing
privacy interests with governmental interests. Courts have usually held that even with suspicion-based searches,
the governmental interest must be great. The generalized governmental interest in eliminating drug use in the
Mather Program does not seem to be a compelling enough interest to uphold even the suspicion-based part of
the drug testing policy. Cf. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1989)
(upholding a drug testing policy that was in part suspicion-based because of the great governmental interest
in regulating safety in the railroad industry); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338-43 (1985) (holding that
school officials may conduct suspicion-based searches of students' property because of the strong interest
school officials having in maintaining discipline in the schools).
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V. CONCLUSION
Overall, the Mather Program's drug testing policy probably would not
survive constitutional scrutiny. Although the policy might be considered con-
stitutional under the "important interests" test articulated in Vernonia School
District,2 09 the Court would probably not expand the use of that test into the
homeless context presented here. No one will argue that Sacramento County has
only philanthropic motives in implementing the drug testing policy at the Mather
Program. Indeed, the Department is correct in stating that a homeless person's
alcohol or drug abuse problem prevents the individual from solving his or her
homelessness problem.210 However, the government must have a "compelling"
interest in requiring drug tests.211 Unfortunately, the Mather Program's desire for
a drug free environment would not be considered "compelling" enough to justify
a privacy intrusion occasioned by drug tests.
209. Cf. Memorandum from Robert A. Ryan, Jr., County Counsel, to Board of Supervisors, County of
Sacramento, supra note 12 (concluding in regards to the Mather Program's drug testing policy that "it is
unlikely that either [the] government's generalized concern to eliminate drug use or its expressed desire to have
a drug free environment would constitute, under the law, either a compelling or important interest sufficient
to justify imposition of a drug testing policy").
210. MATHER DRUG TESTiNG POLICY, supra note 5, § 1.
211. Cf. Memorandum from Robert A. Ryan, Jr., County Counsel, to Board of Supervisors, County of
Sacramento, supra note 12 (suggesting that the Department articulate important or even compelling
governmental interests to be furthered by the drug testing policy at the Mather Program).
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